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Trust and Arena Size. 
 
Expectations, Trust, and Institutions Co-Evolving, 
and Their Critical Population and Group Sizes 
 
Some Clarification in a More Formal Perspective1 
 
 




We develop a formal approach to the emergence of institutionalized trust in the context of the 
evolution of cooperation, with a particular focus on the relevance of the size dimension of this 
process. While trust in general has been widely investigated, as has the size dimension of 
structural emergence, both have rarely been analyzed together in an integrated approach to the 
co-evolution of institutions, trust, and the size of their populations and carrier groups. This 
then also helps explaining general(ized) trust. 
In a game-theoretic set-up, we determine critical levels of expectations as a factor 
facilitating the emergence of institutionalized cooperation in an arena, or population, facing 
the typical, ubiquitous, and everyday social decision situation of the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
(PD). The latter may be solved through the evolution of institutionalized cooperation, as is 
well known. Critical levels of expectations (to meet a cooperative agent) and arena size turn 
out to be interdependent, and supporting the emergence of institutions of cooperation, under a 
particular set of agency capacities and after a minimum critical mass has been established. 
Further, a carrier group, or platform, emerges under further conditions. It encompasses 
only a part of the larger population, indicating a maximum critical mass of cooperators (a 
meso-size) that can be sustained in a population, under an additional set of agency 
capabilities, particularly partner selection (whether the PD has been solved or not). 
Once cooperation has been established as the prevalent behavioral pattern in a number 
of platforms, its habituation as an institution may lead to a contingent perception of 
trustworthiness of agents. Habituated cooperation, its generalization, spillover or transfer 
across platforms, in combination with the perceived trustworthiness of others may lead to an 
increasing general trust level in the larger population. The approach chosen thus allows 
identifying critical factors of general trust among strangers in a larger population even in one-
shot interactions. 
Finally, the significant differences observed in actual general-trust levels among 
countries, highly correlated with their macro performances, thus can be explained from the 
countries’ different (and mainly ‘inner’) size conditions in the deep structures of their 
interaction arenas and resulting platforms (rather than just total population size), contributing 
to the persistent varieties of capitalism. 
 
Keywords: cooperation, group size, habituation, trust  
JEL codes: B52, C73, D83  
 
                                                           
1
 This paper has been presented in a session at the annual conference of the European Association for 
Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE) in Vienna 2011. The authors are grateful to the discussants in that 
session, particularly to Alex Lascaux, Klaus Nielsen, and Paolo Ramazzotti. 
2
 Corresponding author: Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, University of Bremen, Germany. 
Hochschulring 4, 28359 Bremen. +49 421 218 666 11. welsner@uni-bremen.de.  
3





In this paper, we develop a formal approach to the emergence of institutionalized trust in the 
context of the evolution of cooperation (EoC) (e.g., Axelrod 1984/2006; Lindgren 1997; 
Ostrom et al. 1994; also Schotter 1981) with a particular focus on its size dimension. 
Institutionalized trust and cooperation at smaller sizes then will become a critical factor for 
more ‘general(ized) trust’. 
In a game-theoretic (GT) set-up, we can determine critical levels of expectations as a 
factor facilitating the emergence of an institution of cooperation in a population facing the 
typical, ubiquitous and everyday social decision situation of the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD). 
Critical levels of expectations and arena (population) size then turn out to be interdependent. 
A carrier group (or platform) then will coevolve as a further condition for the 
establishment of cooperation. This carrier group encompasses only a part of the larger 
population, indicating a minimum critical mass necessary for the emergence of cooperation in 
our set-up as well as a maximum critical mass of cooperators that can be sustained in a 
population. 
That smaller sizes support the emergence of cooperation and social norms in general 
has been well-established in the literature (e.g., Dejean et al. 2009; Wells 2010; Henrich et al. 
2004; also already Olson 1965). 
The anthropological and behavioral literature dealing with cultural group selection, 
however, has argued against the GT approach of the EoC that it basically can explain only 
small-scale cooperation based on long-run interaction, while in the real world humans do 
cooperate both in large-scale populations and one-shot interactions, i.e., cooperation among 
strangers (see, e.g., Henrich 2004; Boyd, Richerson 2005). Henrich (2004, 7-10), in a much 
discussed state-of-the-art article, deploys (somewhat ad-hoc like) different payoff-based, 
conformist, and punishment-based intra-group mechanisms that, however, do not necessarily 
explain high levels of intra-group cooperation but also might easily work in favor of a culture 
of general defection. These together appear just equivalent to the GT folk theorem, where 
many equilibria superior to the maximin of common defection may become possible under 
trigger strategies with credible threat of punishment. 
So while group selection mechanisms appear perfectly complementary to a GT 
approach embedded in an evolutionary-institutionalist interpretation (EIGT, see Elsner 2012; 
also Hodgson, Huang 2012; see more below), and even appears perfectly apt to GT modeling, 
GT (particularly EIGT) may also do the job for the intra-group development of cooperation. 
And while also the generalization of institutionalized trust and cooperation into one-
shot encounters in large populations still is a common ground of theorizing and modeling 
among ‘naturalistic’ approaches (biology, anthropology, psychology), ‘old’ evolutionary 
institutionalism, and EIGT, it will be our GT-based argument here that some ‘meso’ group (or 
platform) size (i.e., platforms sizes below the whole population) is both a necessary and 
supportive condition for large-scale one-shot cooperation. The inner size structures of 
populations, and related issues like reduced turbulence (e.g., less ‘migration’), thus, explicitly 
arises as a critical variable explaining high levels of general cooperation and macro-
performance – and in the last instance it may even be policy relevant for generating effective 
system structures. 
We will also try to show that and how particular expectations and agency capabilities 
are logically required, step by step, and coevolve to facilitate effective cooperating meso 
platforms that in turn make up for a cooperating large-scale population. 
A GT approach requires and provides a clear understanding of the institutional 
conditions that are assumed at the outset (a shared perception of a problem and of the actions 
of other agents, a ‘common knowledge of rationality’ (CKR), the general ‘rules of the game’). 
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Their identification then allows separating additional factors that increasingly enable a 
process of trust emergence and, indeed, to gradually extend the set of factors we include. 
In fact, the transfer from an individual arena/platform process with its particular ‘local’ 
trust to further platforms, as the condition for the emergence of some more general trust 
existing in the whole population (and then perhaps being transferrable from one arena to 
another), requires embedding the GT formalism in proper qualitative verbal process stories 
(see, e.g., Dosi, Winter 2000; Hodgson, Huang 2012), relevant for real-world settings with 
their strong uncertainty and ambiguity, where trust plays a non-trivial role for the agents (also, 
e.g., Güth, Kliemt, 2010; Grüne-Yanoff, Schweinzer 2008; Six 2005, 2-3). 
Farrell (2009, 13ff.) and many others (e.g., Khalil 1994; Lazaric, Lorenz 1998; 
Nooteboom 2002) have rightly criticized that in rational choice and conventional GT 
approaches to trust cooperative patterns can be interpreted as responding to expectations 
regarding others’ choices on a purely short-run payoff-determined basis only, whereas true 
trust entails expectations of agents going against their immediate payoff-based interests, even 
when they feel they may get away with it – an ‘enlightened self-interest’ by the agents who 
have learned to overcome a myopic culture. A similar criticism might be formulated against 
all approaches that do not (1) provide a methodological locus for presupposed social rules and 
institutions and (2) allow for a theoretical space for particular human capabilities and agency 
capacities to be introduced at proper stages in the logical argument (see also, e.g., Möllering 
2006, 32ff.; Rose 2011, 158ff.). 
The very nature of (the reputation of evidenced) trustworthiness as the foundation for 
trust thus concerns agents’ refraining from actions that would afford them a short-run, one-
shot advantage to the disadvantage of others. With this, the habituation of a cooperative 
behavioral pattern as part of its institutionalization, interpretable by other agents as 
trustworthy behavior, becomes crucial to the process, removing trust from simple calculus and 
pointing towards transdisciplinary research (employing, in the last instance, evolutionary 
economics, psychology, biology, neuroscience, anthropology, …). Particularly, a spillover 
into general trust cannot be explained solely in a formal and calculus-focused approach (e.g., 
also, Coriat, Guennif 1998; Ulsaner 2002). And once cooperative behavior has become 
institutionalized, the expectational effect is cumulatively strengthened (Mengel 2009); just as 
trustful behavior may stimulate trustworthy responses (e.g., Pelligra 2011), introducing 
notions of circular causation that would further support the mechanisms identified here. 
Thus, when developing such embedded GT modeling to explain emerging and co-
evolving ‘contingent trust’, local and global, we have to methodologically consider and 
properly determine the 
• pre-existing cultural givens supposed and required for formal modeling and to 
avoid logical deficiencies; 
• logical loci to introduce further human capacities, such as learning, habituation, 
generalization and other agency capabilities such as memorizing, monitoring, 
reputation building and using reputation chains, and particularly partner 
selection; 
• disciplinary boundaries of economics, particularly in cases like learning, 
habituation and semi-consciousness, or memory and monitoring capacities. 
In particular, we will claim that some cooperative behavior learned in specific arenas is a 
necessary step towards the emergence of more general trust (see also, e.g., Binmore 2006, 
2011; Acemoglu et al. 2010), a conjecture that finds support from empirical approaches 
showing a set of specific cooperative behaviors preceding more general trust (see, e.g., 
Yamagishi et al. 2005; Inglehart, Baker 2000; but also the ‘naturalistic’ perspective:  Henrich 
2004, on psychology and culture-genes interaction). To allow for a meaningful notion of trust, 
we will argue that repeated specific cooperative behavior needs not only to become habituated 
over time, but eventually needs also to be transferred to, and generalized into other particular 
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situations and into the general public of the whole population as well, and be reflected in the 
formation of related beliefs by agents (also, e.g., MacFayden 2006; McKnight, Chervany 
2006). 
Corresponding processes are of course by no means predetermined in their course. The 
setup for the size dimension of institutions of cooperation will show that the emergence of 
cooperation is facilitated by smaller population and group sizes. Even then cooperative 
behavior eventually spilling over into increasing levels of trust is only one of different 
possible directions that the emergence of behavioral patterns may take. Particularly, even if 
established in different smaller groups or platforms (or networks, reflecting the famous 
‘bonding’ social capital, according to Putnam 2000, pp. 22-24), its transfer to other interaction 
arenas and platforms and into the whole population (the ‘bridging’ social capital, according to 
Putnam) may or may not happen. This a priori openness would generally require considering 
a whole variety of levels of institutionalized cooperation and related trust in different groups 
(see also, Aoki 2007; Pelligra 2011; Henrich 2004). Reflected in the present approach, 
however, is, for the sake of simplicity, just a combination of two levels from which trust has 
been approached, the micro-level with the habituation of behavior by individuals, and the 
‘normatized’, or institutionalized notion of trust as relevant on a higher level of aggregation 
(also, e.g., Nooteboom 2002). 
In this paper, we therefore complement, as mentioned, what Henrich (2004) and others 
have presented in their discussion of the possibilities of large-scale cooperation. Based on the 
observation that this phenomenon is seen in human groups to a degree not found in any other 
animal species, he argues that specific human and cultural factors are likely candidates for 
explanations. The mechanisms he identifies as likely candidates are based in human sociality, 
and so the necessity for a move beyond just short-run payoff-based arguments for real-world 
agents is underlined here. 
Behavioral patterns that are embodied in such institutional guidelines are not 
consciously followed, as conformism and punishment would suggest, but habitually applied 
once they have emerged as the dominant correlated patterns of behavior. In the following, 
habituation and semi-conscious behavior will become more important still. Cooperative 
behavior will have to be repeated and repeatedly experienced before analogous behavior can 
be expected to emerge in arenas that have not been touched by such experiences thus far. This 
divorces the longer term maintenance of patterns of behavior from too narrow individualist 
decision-making. 
Thus, the wide variety of levels of general trust in different countries as documented 
by the so-called World Value Surveys, could be accounted for in an EIGT framework not 
only due to its generally ex ante undetermined outcomes (see also, e.g., Aoki 2001) but also 
through the different levels of inner size (platform) structures (and often also general 
population size). The overlapping, meso-sized carrier platforms of institutions and trust that 
we eventually arrive at indeed apply to real-world institutional phenomena. The widely noted 
correlation between levels of trust and macroeconomic performance (see, e.g., Rose 2011, 
171-2; Knack, Keefer 1997; Malul et al. 2010; Maskell 2004) and the continuing discussions 
of Varieties of Capitalism, i.e., the distinct dynamics and functioning of national economic 
systems in their deep interaction structures, even across apparently similar economies, situate 
the co-emergence of increased levels of general trust and platform sizes at the heart of 
economic research. 
We continue (2) with the everyday relevance and ubiquity of the social dilemma 
structure and of the emergence of institutionalized cooperation and its cultural, 
‘informational’, and ‘expectational’ givens. In the following sections, we (3) discuss the 
single-shot PD supergame (SG) solution; (4) identify the emerging (co-evolving) size-
dimension of arenas for institutionalized cooperative behavior in populations; and (5) 
investigate the co-evolution of carrier-group size, platform-specific (local) trust, and 
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institutionalized cooperation, based on further agency mechanisms. Finally, we (6) consider 
the generalization of trust across platforms into whole populations. Conclusions are offered in 
the final section. 
 
 
2 Shared Knowledge, Beliefs, and Expectations in a Game-Theoretic Setting – and 
 Embedding Formalism in a Real-World Perspective 
 
GT settings are, of course, not without any priors. Even non-cooperative GT settings that, if 
embedded in an overall prudent research setting, may be considered a rather lean formal 
approach with the promise of a considerable analytical explanatory net gain, do require 
considerable ‘cultural’ givens. Among those givens are a common understanding among 
agents of the rules of the game, some (common) degree of completeness of the information 
set, some commonality in terms of correct mutual comprehension of each other’s actions, and 
the ‘CKR’ mentioned (‘I know that you know that I know that … I/you behave rationally’). 
We may interpret these givens as establishing some initial set of subjective expectations about 
how the others may act. 
Even provided these givens, however, the eventual outcomes in games with more than 
one Nash Equilibrium (NE) cannot be generally predicted; any one of the possible NEs may 
result, depending on initial conditions and/or on a resulting process. In order to determine a 
NE, agents have to form expectations about which strategy choices of the other(s) seem most 
likely. If we want to make predictions in such a setting, we already have to refer to some 
beliefs of agents about others’ behaviors. Thus, some social rules or institutions have to be 
assumed preexisting that allow agents to formulate such expectations (and, correspondingly, 
external observers to make forecasts). For analyses that have to deal with more than a unique 
and predetermined stable outcome, the embedding of the GT formalism into broader socio-
economic settings becomes helpful or even crucial in order to more thoroughly understand the 
subject (see, e.g., Schelling’s focal points: Schelling 1960). 
Such a framework is especially interesting when the problem is not one of simple 
coordination only, where coordination is in everyone’s immediate interest (difficult as these 
may already be in populations, especially if interests regarding which of the different NEs is 
preferable, differ). If problem-structures are involved that must be captured as social dilemma 
problems, where individually optimal myopic decisions lead to a socially inferior NE, agents 
will have to find a Pareto-superior solution to a particularly ‘wicked’ collective-decision 
problem. For agents in a population and in long-run processes, this will have to involve the 
emergence of an institutional solution that enables cooperative behavior (despite the 
ubiquitous one-shot incentive to defect, to free-ride and exploit, which continues to be present 
for real-life agents) that would offer reasonable assurance or trust about others’ likely 
cooperation. 
These two distinct basic problem structures, coordination games and dilemma games, 
are related to a classic definition of social rules (to solve a coordination game) that work 
without an endogenous sanction (as it is in everyone’s immediate and myopic interest to act 
coordinated), and social institutions (to solve a dilemma game) that require the sacrifice of the 
myopic maximum, habituation and ‘semi-consciousness’, and therefore do not work without 
the threat of sanctions to bring about cooperation (for the terminology, see, e.g., Schotter 
1981). 
The social dilemma is a ubiquitous and everyday problem structure of decentralized 
individualistic economies, and the more so the more pronounced a myopic culture is given at 
the outset (a ‘worst-case’ starting point in the following). In fact, every single simple 
transaction (including any ‘market’ transaction) is embedded in such a potential wider social 
dilemma, with ubiquitous opportunities to free-ride and exploit the other(s) and any of their 
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cooperative behaviors, whether already collectively institutionalized or not. Such defection 
would undermine potential expectations of cooperation and the potential joint (broader, 
collective) and long-run improvement that mutual cooperation would allow for. 
If an instrumental (problem-solving) institution does not yet exist, its establishment 
may be difficult, given that in that case warranted prevalent expectations would point to 
others’ non-contribution. But even if such an institution of cooperation already existed, under 
certain conditions favoring myopic and overly individualistic behavior again, incentives to 
exploit others’ cooperative behaviors, and thus the institution as such, may return. In this way, 
institutional systems may be fragile and vulnerable to relapses, i.e., institutional breakdowns. 
Returning to the more formal aspects, as is well-known, a dilemma problem cannot be 
solved by the rational agents of conventional GT analysis. The problem-structure has to be 
transformed first. One possibility for doing this is the repeated play of the same basic game. 
The indefinite repetition of the problem, requiring a somewhat stable environment, allows for 
a process that we may interpret as corresponding to a cumulative learning process and is a 
first step towards the possibility to realize superior results. The agents then have to repeatedly 
play the resulting SG in order to become able to consistently coordinate on a cooperative 
behavioral pattern within a larger group. A superior result can be realized on a sustained basis 
when many agents adopt cooperative behavioral patterns and a stable (strategy-) environment 
results. 
Such repetitions lend themselves to a better understanding of processes of institutional 
emergence in a population, either interpreted as the result of decision-processes by agents 
revising and updating their individual game plans, i.e., individual learning, or considered as 
an outcome of a replication process (‘selection’) on a somehow diversified population, in 
which certain types of behaviors gain an advantage (path-depending on the initial structure). 
Both perspectives eventually lead to stable outcomes that permit interpretations from an 
evolutionary-institutional perspective and can serve as the foundation for a broader view on 
social phenomena when we leave the narrow analytical framework of a GT representation. 
Real-world agents continue facing dilemma situations, even if they may not recognize 
them as such any longer, due to their habituated and ‘semi-conscious’ institutionalized 
cooperative behavior, or to their acceptance of such an institutional framework as ‘naturally’ 
given or even an abstract ‘norm’ (which has become somewhat removed over time from the 
original problem). This is one of the instances where the assumptions of the formal model and 
the difficulty of transferring its results to real-world questions, becomes important:  Whereas 
the formal solution entails changing the problem-structure the agents face, for the real-world 
agents the problem-structure will not be changed per se, but the agents will be supported in 
better dealing with the problems, amongst other things by the factors that the formal analysis 
helps to point to. In fact, for real-world agents, a solution of dilemma problems can only work 
as a learned, habituated, and semi-consciously applied social behavioral institution. 
Still, the mechanisms and factors that can be identified as supporting the emergence of 
institutionalized cooperation in a formal setting do help us understand the emergence of 
cooperation in real-world situations. But we have to consider how we can transfer the formal 
results to real-world settings, in this case, to complement the formal result by a proper 
understanding of the institutions and the related framing of expectations that inform agents’ 
decisions. 
Following the identification of factors that enable an institutionalized Pareto-superior 
outcome, we will argue that we can build on the results obtained to consistently and 
transparently integrate trust into the argument, in a first step by building on favorable 
expectations of future behaviors of others that go against their immediate payoff-based 
interests, i.e., expectations regarding the others’ trustworthiness. These expectations will 
eventually co-evolve as semi-conscious responses to habituated behaviors that have emerged 
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over time from the learned or differentially replicated (‘selected’) cooperative behavior 
existing in large parts of the real social sphere. 
 
 
3 A Prisoners’ Dilemma ‘Single-Shot’ Perspective and the Role of Expectations 
 
In PD-SGs, in fact, a substantial (in fact, an infinite) number of stable outcomes (strategy 
combinations) exist that allow for an improvement of results above the outcome achievable 
when just sticking to the dominant strategy of the underlying one-shot game. There are well-
known proofs for that, collected as the ‘folk theorems’ (Friedman 1971). In order to keep the 
analytical structure to a manageable magnitude we draw on the results of Axelrod 
(1984/2006) and some research on PD-SGs in population contexts (Nowak, Sigmund 1992; 
Lindgren 1997; Mailath, Samuelson 2006), showing that there are some basic characteristics 
of strategies that have proven to lead to an overall rather successful performance when 
compared in different and even evolving strategy-environments. These characteristics include 
non-aggressiveness (not defecting first), and the willingness to retaliate against defection by 
others, coupled with forgiveness, the willingness to return to cooperation after having 
punished an opponent. The simplest practical representation of such a strategy has come to be 
called tit-for-tat (TFT):  In a SG, start cooperating (the strictly dominated strategy in the 
underlying one-shot game) and then mirror your opponent’s prior move in all future 
decisions. Hence, we limit the perspective to TFT and All-D (‘always defect’) in the 
following. The related PD-SG payoffs are given in Figure 1 below. 
The time horizon of the agents (as to be learned, habituated, and acquired as a culture) 
is reflected in the value of the discount parameter δ. If the time horizon is too short (future 
payoffs are discounted at too high a rate, δ is too small), the dilemma structure will be 
maintained, and All-D will be the strictly dominant strategy choice, the repetition 
notwithstanding. If, however, the time horizon is long enough (future payoffs are valued 
sufficiently highly), the decision situation will be transformed into a coordination problem, as 
TFT becomes a best answer to itself. If TFT is a best answer to itself, a credible threat of 
sanctioning exists against defection through which cooperative behavior can be enforced. The 
result is a coordination game in which an unequivocally optimal behavior no longer exists (as 




A =  
 
 
Figure 1 –PD-SG Payoffs for TFT and All-D (with b>a>c>d). 
 
 
The condition that has to be fulfilled for allowing that transformation is the well-known 




It is derived from the comparison of the discounted current capital values of infinite geometric 
series of payoffs attainable under different game plans, specifically the comparison of 
TFT/TFT and All-D/TFT payoffs (as illustrated in Figure 1), showing under which condition 
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of futurity, or expectations (i.e., the size of δ, given the strength of the dilemma in the payoff 
structure, represented by (b-a)/(b-c)), TFT becomes a best answer to itself. 
Note that the discount factor includes the probability, existing in any given interaction, 
to meet the same agent again next interaction, thus futurity. In fact, δ consists of two 
components, the discount rate (time preference) r and the (subjective) expectation, or 
(objective, experienced) probability, depending, p that the interaction between two agents 




The condition of inequality (1) has been the standard solution for a PD-SG environment (for 
more detailed considerations within a population approach, see below), with a responsive 
cooperative strategy involved and expectations as a critical factor. The single-shot condition is 
thus the deterministic and static logical condition for the institution of cooperation contingent 
on expectations (embodied in the strategy TFT) to result as a possible NE. 
Note that the related definition of an institution is a social rule for the decision/ 
behavior of individual agents for the solution of PD-SGs that has gained, through a process of 
social learning and ‘semi-conscious’ habituation, a general approval so that it can inform 
agents about proper problem-solving behavior and mutually consistent expectations about 
that, particularly about the fact that with unilateral defection other agents will also deviate in 
the future, so that all will be worse off than with rule-conforming behavior (the endogenous 
sanction mechanism).  
If the single-shot condition is fulfilled, the problem for the agents is to coordinate. 
This is still a problem to be solved, but a different one from the dilemma; and one that agents 
are capable of solving. Coordination on the (Pareto-superior) best answer pairs may 
eventually emerge. Still, that additional (superior, cooperative) NE does not guarantee that 
agents will actually be coordinating on it. For instance, agents might not change their 
behavior of initially choosing the defection strategy, if they are sufficiently risk-averse and 
want to protect themselves from other agents not changing their behavior. 
For real-world agents, learning about the importance of the future, and the 
consequences today’s behavior can have once future interactions are taken into account, is 
thus a first important step to be taken, and in many instances a necessary condition for 
cooperative behavior to emerge (for another possibility, see the discussion of agency 
mechanisms below in Section 5). 
Generalizing the formal framework somewhat further, we may say that the belief has 
to emerge that the other player(s) will adopt a cooperative behavior pattern; or, in a 
population setting, that a sufficient number of other agents will adopt a cooperative behavior 
pattern, something that might be reflected by the metaphor of a contrât social (Rousseau 
1762), explicit or tacit, or some related public (policy) assurance (Sen 1967), so that agents do 




4 A Population Perspective, ‘Arena’ Size, and ‘Critical Minimum Mass’ 
 
4.1 A Population Perspective 
 
We can approach emerging cooperative behavior in a population through explicitly 
considering population size, or the size of the arena, in which interactions take place. Still, 
expectations and resulting expected payoffs, now integrating both population (arena) size n 
and the number of cooperators in the population (the later emerging platform) k, i.e., 
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expectations (experienced or not) regarding the ratio k/n, remain the driver of the process. We 
continue with games played by two types of, now randomly matched, players. The expected 
payoffs then depend on the probability of meeting either TFT-cooperators or All-D-defectors, 
agents’ strategy choices therefore depend on their expectations regarding the prevalence of 
certain types, or likelihood of strategy-choices, in the population from which their interaction 
partners are drawn. (As can be easily appreciated here, the argument can be rephrased in 
terms of evolutionary game theory, including mixed strategies or even a replicator 
mechanism. However, as expectations of agents, and accordingly taken decisions, are a 
crucial part of our argument at this point, it is quite appropriate to present the point in terms of 
more conventional GT.) 






Figure 2 shows their graphical representation, for a situation when the single-shot condition is 




Figure 2 – Payoff Schedules of a PD-SG Played Pair-wise in a Population. 
 
 
4.2 Enlarged Agency and the ‘Critical Minimum Mass’ 
 
The intersection of the payoff schedules then gives the share of cooperators in the population, 
for which TFTs’ expected payoffs are equal to those of All-Ds’. This ‘minimum critical mass’ 
of cooperators now depends on both the value of the discount factor and the relative arena 
size k/n. The larger future expectations (δ) are, the lower the share of cooperators required for 





We may assume here that agents are aware of the possibility of improvement above the results 
of repeated mutual defection, if a sufficient number of agents are willing to change behavior 
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starting from an initial All-D equilibrium. How might agents come to start cooperation? They 
start diversifying their behavior motivated by repeated frustration in the repeated dilemma. 
Meeting repeatedly, particularly with an indefinite end (that at least is beyond the practical 
time horizon of agents), may allow for such a process to start. Even if they were not aware of 
the superior results from mutual cooperation, but rather were just frustrated by always 
aspiring to b and always receiving c only, they might start experimenting, out of a general 
‘instrumental’ motivation to improve their conditions or simply curiosity (the instinct of 
workmanship, or idle curiosity according to Veblen, e.g., Veblen 1899, 1914). 
Real-world agents, who would follow these motivations, however, may not be too risk 
averse, nor too envious of others’ results, as they run the risk of ending up receiving even less 
than they currently have, but at least having somewhat less than the other one at the end of the 
day (being exploited at least once by their less innovative interaction partner). Their 
‘rationality’ still implies being indifferent towards the others’ payoffs. 
Still, such search, experimentation, and diversification may generate the minimum 
critical mass necessary for establishing an environment in which cooperation in fact will 
become the superior choice for all. 
The already mentioned ‘social contract’, or some other form of ‘general assurance’ 
(mentioned above) that other agents will indeed choose (TFT-) cooperation as well, also may 
support a change that alters the predominant choice in a population, as an assurance that 
enough agents choose TFT would eventually make it the preferable choice for the rest as well 
if this assurance can have an impact on the formulation of expectations of the agents. Thus, in 
sum, evolving expectations are a crucial aspect in this set-up. 
This shows that it is 
• the agents’ expectations, and their learned, and then habituated, 
institutionalized and culturally ‘embedded’ perspective, ‘futurity’ or time 
horizon, combined with 
• the relative size k/n of the initial carrier group of cooperation in the arena under 
consideration, the minimum critical mass, of the emerging institution, based 
upon 
• some specific, enlarged agency capability for behavioral innovation 
that matter, and will be shaped by their prior assumptions, beliefs, and expectations and their 
interaction experiences. Initial expectations thus will be adapted over time and eventually 
solidified, habituated and institutionalized, until they can be assumed to shape behavioral 
choices without the agents being consciously aware of them every time they face a certain 
decision problem. 
In fact, expectations and relative size, based on extended agency, will have to co-
evolve in the process of the emergence of the institution of cooperation. 
 
 
4.3 Expectations Across a Series of ‘Rounds’ With Random Partner Change, and Their 
 Dependence on ‘Arena’ Size and Cooperators’ Share 
 
We may further formalize population and group sizes through a series of SGs, where we will 
refer to one SG in such a series as a round. Rounds are characterized by random partner 
changes between each two of them. Agents then may remember their previous partner across 
such rounds, as well as their strategy choices in the last interaction. 
Should they be paired with the same interaction partner again in the following round, 
this would constitute the continuation of the previous one for them. This possibility can be 
reflected in the discount factor valid across rounds, introducing a slight change in the case of 
indefinite SGs (while it would make no difference for a definitely infinite SG). 
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The probability of meeting the same agent again (after a round has ended) is 1/n. The 
overall discount parameter (δ2) to calculate the overall value of interacting with a given other 
agent then depends on the probability that the SG continues, plus the probability that this is 




For p<1, an indefinite SG, the size dimension becomes relevant as the current value of 
interactions depends also on the population size – the smaller the population is, the higher the 
expectation of ‘meeting again’. δ2 will approach p/(1+r) in the case of increasing n 
(diminishing probability ‘to meet again’), and 1/(1+r) in the case of decreasing n (increasing 
probability ‘to meet again’). The smaller the population, the larger the discount factor is, and, 
with this, the present value of an infinite series of payoffs from interactions within and across 
SG rounds, for a given incentive structure. Put the other way around, interactions get more 
valuable in smaller populations for given values of p.4 
This becomes clearer when we put k as a function of n, just as in the above case of 




Dividing by n, we can derive an expression giving the critical share κ of cooperators, 




(5’’) shows that κ is a decreasing function of n. This means that the value of k is not changing 
proportionally to that of n, but more than proportionally, as the minimum share is a function 
of overall size due to the n in δ2. Consequently, the intersection of the payoff schedules in 
Figure 2 is shifted to the left when population size is decreasing, all else equal:  In smaller 
populations you actually need a smaller share of cooperators, a smaller minimum critical 
mass, making it relatively easier to establish a cooperative environment, because the value of 
interactions with cooperators increases. Formally, the logic of the equation shows that the 
expectation (δ2) and relative size (k/n) need to co-evolve, as the equation cannot be solved for 
δ2 and κ simultaneously. 
 
 
                                                           
4
 If we would assume further agency capacities, particularly partner selection opportunities (see below 
on this capacity), we might consider agents to tend to stick to their ‘known’ partners (if not strictly the 
same) and to make counter movements against increasing turbulence and mobility given in increasing 
populations, in order to keep their expectations high and uncertainty moderate, attempting to keep 
interactions with agents within a peer group ni, with ni<n. Such phenomena might explain counter 
movements towards local networking, clustering, and ‘glocalization’ or regionalization, even re-nationalization 
among agents in a globalizing and increasingly turbulent world. Such attempts of agents can also be reflected in 
an increasing p, where agents would strive to conserve interactions with partners they already know. Also, lab 
experiments have shown that agents indeed try to reduce net complexity through active selection and active 
building of neighborhoods (see, e.g., Harmsen-van Hout et al. 2008), and that high network effects can 




5 Alternative Agency Mechanisms:  The Co-Evolution of ‘Platform’ Size, Trust, 
and Institutional Cooperation with Partner Selection 
 
We can further extend the model describing expectations and expected payoffs, and their co-
evolution with relative size of populations and the carrier groups of institutionalized 
cooperation, by considering other agency mechanisms – monitoring, memory, and reputation 
chains. These new capacities would permit that agents exchange information regarding 
others’ earlier behaviors, which then becomes useful when we additionally permit some 
partner selection. 
In this case, agents may not just form an idea about the composition of the population 
in general (k/n) but also about some other agents’ earlier behavior. These capabilities can 
enhance the capacity to establish a cooperative environment. The payoff functions in this case 






The peer-group of the agents is still the whole population; however, the probabilities of 
meeting certain types of agents can be improved above their general prevalence in the whole 
population (which is k/n). Cooperative agents will be able to identify, select, and interact with 
their kind with a higher probability than they would under random matching (cooperative 
agents have a reason to reject interactions with known defecting agents, which is not the case 
the other way around). This will improve the results they can achieve beyond the results of 
random matching.5 Monitoring, memorizing and using a reputation chain can be considered 
informational preconditions for selecting agents. 
Assume that in the process of search, experimentation and behavioral diversification 
motivated as described above, cooperators start to select agents (on such agency capacities, 
see, e.g., Davis 2007, 2008; Dolfsma, Verburg 2008; Leydesdorff 2007). It is supposed that 
the cooperative agent has some capacity to reject interaction with a known defector. 
The exponent α in equts. (7) and (8) above represents the strength of the new agency 
mechanisms. As 0<α<1, the smaller α, the more pronounced the effect of these agency 
capacities in favor of cooperators. In effect, this may enable cooperators to realize larger gains 
already for low numbers of cooperators in a population. In this way the intersection of the 
payoff schedules shifts further to the left so that the minimum critical mass requirement for 
emerging cooperation decreases further (kcrit will shift to the left in the graphical illustration). 
Cooperative behavior could also be established this way in populations when the 
underlying dilemma is not solved, when δ2 is not large enough to ensure the transformation of 
a dilemma problem into a coordination problem in a SG. The reason for this is that partner 
selection enables them to pick agents as interaction partners that have been cooperating 
before, and are memorized and/or have been monitored and/or have gained some reputation as 
cooperators (for the value of reputation see, e.g., Dasgupta 1988; Mailath, Samuelson 2006). 
Figure 3 shows a graphical illustration of the payoff schedules, when such agency 
mechanisms are allowed for, in a population for the case that the underlying dilemma is not 
solved (for the shape of the expected payoff schedules, check the derivatives that will give 
                                                           
5
 As indicated in footnote 2, partner selection may also be considered equivalent with an agency 
capacity to increase p in δ and δ2, and in this way extend any PD-SG (‘round’) at the expense of 
partner change, ‘mobility’, and ‘turbulence’. 
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Figure 3 – Population Payoff Schedules with Partner Selection of Cooperators (when the 
Basic Dilemma is Not Solved) – and the Exhaustion of Such Capacity:  The ‘Maximum 
Critical Mass’. 
 
But still, the agents cannot know every agent in the whole population, and thus, with new and 
unknown upcoming interaction partners, the capacity to reject an interaction partner does not 
help with a view on selecting ‘known’ cooperators all the time. Particularly, information may 
also get thinner, more unclear, uncertain, and fuzzy, especially if related through third actors 
and ever longer reputation chains are deployed. 
Alternatively, if they knew about every agent, we could assume that not every 
interaction can be refused, but only some of them, a limited partner selection capacity. In any 
case, meetings with All-D players cannot always be avoided and some defection is rational in 
this setting.  
In a setting as illustrated in Figure 3, therefore, two stable equilibria emerge, an All-D 
population as before, and the mixed population at the second intersection (k/n)max. This 
maximum share of cooperators sustainable under given parameters can be conceived of as a 
meso-level carrier group for the institution, the emerging final and stable platform of settled 
cooperative interaction (for the conception of meso-economics, see, e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 
2009, 2011). 
In real-world situations, of course, agents are not given pure-strategy types, always 
behaving the same way, but may show both cooperative and defective behavior, depending on 
the constellation of the critical factors elaborated here. This is reflected by the formal 
interpretation, where the upper equilibrium at (k/n)max, rather than designating a clear-cut 
cultural or strategy structure of the population (where All-D would be considered a social rule 
and thus a ‘culture’, too), is equivalent to a mixed strategy played by all agents in the 
population. 
In all, agency mechanisms such as monitoring, memory, and reputation, in connection 
with partner selection, provide another possibility to achieve results that are superior to those 
of mutual defection, even if the underlying dilemma is not solved in the SG. When the 
dilemma is transformed into a coordination problem plus partner selection working, the 
necessary minimum share of cooperators is simply further reduced relative to the same 
situation without those agency mechanisms. 
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More information about others’ behaviors thus increases the chances for the 
establishment of generally cooperative behavior in a population. And agency capacities such 
as partner selection, thus, are working in equivalent ways as sanctioning in the earlier single-
shot perspective, which has also been well-known in lab experiments and behavioral 
economics for long (for extra sanctioning and face-to-face communication in the PD played in 
the lab, see, e.g., the classic of Ostrom et al. 1994). 
As we have seen, contingent expectations are a critical and co-evolving factor of an 
emerging institution of cooperation in a particular-population arena and carrier-group 
platform or a particular interaction area of that population. But how could this spill over into a 
culture of more general trust across all themes, arenas and platforms of a population? 
 
 
6 Problem-Solving Trust in Different and Overlapping ‘Meso’-Sized Platforms, 
and Their Transfer and Spill-Over into ‘General Trust’:  Different Cultures 
Explained 
 
As we have seen, cooperative behavior can emerge more easily, for a given incentive 
structure, when 
• interaction arenas and required minimum critical masses therein are relatively 
smaller and 
• expectations to meet a cooperative agent are higher and the culturally acquired 
time horizon is longer. 
These results hold independently of whether we approach the question from a perspective of 
active choice of strategies or of a selection of behavioral traits through a replicator, even 
though the specific interpretations would vary according to the set-up, as it is of course 
conceivable that behavioral predispositions are emerging within the individual agents and thus 
are selectable, laying the foundation for later habituated cooperative behavior in other areas. 
The co-emergence of expectations in particular arenas or thematic areas of arenas is 
only one major step in the transfer of the model setting and findings to real-world problem-
situations. Agents in individual (thematic) platforms that have emerged have to form more 
general ideas about how others will behave when they choose their actions beyond the 
individual platform. The understanding for the process playing out therefore needs to be 
complemented by additional considerations more closely formulated with an eye on real-
world agents. We already have discussed additional assumptions and mechanisms (search and 
experimentation, non-enviousness, risk-taking, ‘workmanship’, ‘curiosity’, memory, 
monitoring, reputation building and partner selection), introduced in a logical sequence, that 
may support the process in real-world situations and bring the formal argument and setting 
closer to the real world. 
We now assume that every agent is interacting with many different others in different, 
potentially overlapping arenas or thematic areas in one arena (may be playing more than one 
game at a time). Arenas/thematic areas may overlap in terms of interconnected 
interdependence structures, geography, and agents (same population and overlapping parts of 
a population). Beyond that, different arenas/areas may be characterized by different types of 
problem structures. Finally, even the same two agents in the same situation may be interacting 
in different problem structures with different behavioral results simultaneously. 
However, once a particular cooperative environment has been established in a critical 
minimum number of possibly overlapping emerged platforms, agents may follow the general 
learned behavioral pattern, i.e. a critical minimum mass of institutionalized cooperations, 
habitually not only on each platform, but may accomplish a transfer or spillover of 
institutionalized behavior and trust embedded therein into other specific arenas and eventually 
into a more general habituation and thus into the broader setting of the whole population made 
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up of all specific areas and emerged platforms. The institutionalization of cooperative 
behavior results in an embedding of trustworthiness as a desirable character trait into the 
value structure of the population. This, eventually, can account for the establishment of a 
generally trustworthy behavior in the population and a reflection of this in generalized trusting 
attitudes. This may spill over to a generalized trust to meet a cooperator in the population in 
any next interaction, even in areas and situations that are not covered by those in which the 
cooperative behavior originally emerged. 
Such a process may rely partly on an ‘internalization of norms’ that Gintis (2003) has 
identified as an ‘important prosocial psychological mechanism’, supporting the sustainability 
of cooperative behavior patterns. Increasing levels of general trust may then be observed in 
geographically and culturally defined populations (typically nations and regions, both sub- 
and supra-nationally). Modern psychology, anthropology and behavioral sciences are 
currently working on the details of such habituation/transfer/generalization and/or respective 
behavioral ‘selection’, be it on an individual basis or as forms of group selection among 
groups that have differentially succeeded to develop critical levels of cultures of cooperation 
(see, e.g., Boyd, Richerson 2005,; Henrich 2004; Dunbar 2011; Henrich, Boyd et al. 2004). 
Elsewhere, we have argued that phenomena of diverging trust and performance levels 
in various areas may indicate considerable systemic differences in the ‘tacit’ and ‘disguised’ 
‘deep’ interaction structures of countries, such as their different ‘inner’ size structures as a 
potential critical factor (see, e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 2009; also, e.g., Christoforou 2010; Dakhli, 





In this paper, we have offered a way to approach trust in a formal, directly-interdependent, 
i.e., EIGT framework. This framework puts trust in the context of institutional emergence, the 
co-evolution of favorable expectations regarding others’ cooperative behavior in a problem-
solving process. As a typical and ubiquitous real-world complex common and collective (i.e., 
both individual and social) decision structure the PD-SG has been used. In this way, we have 
largely argued in the theoretical area defined by Schotter, Axelrod, Lindgren and many others. 
One particular advantage of that approach is that we can show that and how expectations are a 
critical factor of a co-evolutionary solution and a crucial step on the way to capturing general 
trust. The setting helps to define minimal requirements that have to be met for expectations to 
be sufficient for inducing cooperative behavior in agents and thereby to outline conditions 
supportive of the emergence of cooperative behavior in groups. We have then referred to the 
habituation and institutionalization of such behavior as the pre-condition for its transfer to 
other platforms and the foundation for a generalized trustworthiness as the condition needed 
for supporting the emergence of elevated levels of general trust. 
This paper focuses specifically on investigating trust in the context of another basic 
critical factor, namely, size. The emergence and general role of trust thus reflects a most basic 
real-world interrelation, i.e., the institutionalization of trust and the inner size structure of real 
socio-economies, or their deep structure in terms of interaction arenas and their established 
system of platforms carrying institutions. We share this conclusion with another well-known 
ontological approach to ‘micro-meso-macro’ (see Dopfer, Foster, Potts 2004). But we know 
also from real-world surveys that general trust largely differs and even diverges among 
apparently similar and adjacent national economies. So we are also in the middle of ongoing 
discussions of the persistence of the diversity of capitalisms. 
The non-cooperative GT context, in methodological terms, enables us to clearly make 
distinctions between the minimum set of cultural givens that we assume already at the outset, 
such as some basic beliefs and some common knowledge about and understanding of a 
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situation. The methodological advantage of the approach is extended in the sense that we are 
able to identify stepwise further agency requirements to add to the initial set of givens at 
different stages in the pursuit of the logic of the question. 
The approach thus also enables us to apply a terminology depending on the specifics 
of a social dilemma problem as compared with a more simple coordination problem. 
Important here is that we must, and can, distinguish between social rules of coordination and 
social institutions of cooperation and show that the latter require a particular set of further 
agency capacities. Among these emerge issues such as habituation, semi-conscious behavior, 
and generalization of interactively learned behavioral properties. In an evolutionary 
perspective, embracing modern behavioral and complexity sciences from biology through 
anthropology to economics and systems theories, we would have to more explicitly deal with 
the process of diversification and selection of such behavioral traits, in this way perhaps 
integrating the naturalistic and the EIGT approaches on the issue of group selection. In an 
evolutionary-institutional interpretation of non-cooperative GT (EIGT), in particular, we 
would have to deal with the dissection and the embedding of the related folk theorem of 
dilemma solving. 
More generally, the methodological advantage of that approach appears to be the clear 
requirements coming up to embed its formalism in a broader process story and thus combine 
formal analysis with verbal and qualitative theorizing and conceptualizing. In evolutionary 
economics, we are facing the particular problem of bringing together the different ends and 
paradigmatic cultures of (original) evolutionary-institutional economics (OIE) and an 
evolutionary-institutional interpretation of GT, on which Hodgson and Huang have elaborated 
recently (Hodgson, Huang 2012; see also Elsner 2012 for more references in that field). 
Using the formal steps of our investigation as a structure, we start with the well-known 
single-shot perspective of solving a PD by transforming it into a coordination game through 
repetition. Here, expectations to meet the same agent again in the future and related agency 
capacities, among them an acquired and learned culture of broad ‘recognized 
interdependence’ (for the Veblenian/OIE tradition of this, see, e.g., Bush 1999) and long-term 
futurity (on this, in the OIE tradition, e.g., Commons 1934) are critical factors. 
In a second step we have introduced a population perspective, adding the minimum-
critical-mass condition that together with population size, expectations, and particular further 
agency capacities (experiencing frustration, developing search and experimentation, 
workmanship, curiosity, innovation …) may solve the problem. By conceptualizing a series of 
PD-SGs with random partner change in a population among such rounds we integrate 
population size as a critical factor in expectations, showing that smaller population size is a 
favorable factor for emerging institutionalized cooperation, particularly through the supra-
proportional decrease of the minimum-critical-mass requirement (see also, e.g., Henrich 2004, 
8 f.). 
We then introduce more particular agency capacities, namely the ability to collect 
more information on specific individual agents through memory, monitoring, and building 
reputation and making use of the reputation chain, in order to increase the chance to meet a 
cooperator rather than the same agent as before. Beyond learning about (k/n), the resulting 
capacity to select an interaction partner, or reject one, to some degree, then further supports 
emerging cooperative behavior in a specific arena. Partner selection (preferential grouping) 
here becomes a critical agency capacity. 
While cooperators may increase their relative success fairly quickly at early stages of 
the interaction process when the additional agency mechanisms are permitted, their 
cooperative advantage is eventually exhausted as marginal gains decrease and discounted 
payoffs establish a firm upper limit. We have illustrated that not only the minimum-critical-
mass requirement for the emergence of cooperation further decreases but also that the 
emerging platform size of cooperation has an upper limit below the size of the whole arena 
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population (i.e., a meso-size) when the underlying dilemma of the one-shot problem cannot be 
transformed in the repetition of the game. Cooperation may come into being more easily 
given additional agency capacities but may also have its limits, where defection becomes the 
rational and superior strategy. 
In another step, one might introduce the ability of agents to even build their individual 
peer group structure (reducing the population n to some specific ni), which may further 
improve (k/n) to (ki/ni), with (ki/ni) > (k/n), in a process leading to distinct neighborhoods in a 
population. A reduction of the overall n may, however, only lead to the reduction of the 
minimum-critical-mass requirement in our set-up, as the problem to be solved by the agents 
remains the same in substance independently of the number n or ni of agents involved. And 
one might argue about whether just smaller, tighter groups are indeed a promising step 
towards the establishment of an increased level of generalized trust. For a different dynamic 
in the process, at this point we would have to introduce defined neighborhood (including 
migration) structures that the agents themselves can shape to some degree. 
The structuring of a population in order to ease the emergence of cooperative behavior 
patterns at less complex interaction levels, in order to serve as the foundation for a farther 
reaching general cooperation, is a result that seems to be shared even with what we can derive 
from the naturalistic approaches (e.g., Henrich 2004). 
In a final step, we generalize trust, learned and practiced in a critical minimum set of 
individual arenas and substantial areas and then emerging meso-sized platforms. The process 
of generalization, spill-over, or transfer into more and further individual arenas might help the 
further diffusion of a cooperative culture in which trustworthy behavior becomes established 
as a part of an overall value-system and is shown and spilled over habitually. Further 
habituation then helps explain (only verbally, though, in this paper) the emergence of what 
nowadays has become the topical issue of general trust in a number of platforms, usually 
distinguishing a geographically defined national or regional culture. Many individual 
institutionalized constellations of cooperation may combine into a predominant culture of 
cooperation; which they have to for the positive results of general trust to be accessible to a 
larger group. 
For a transfer of those theoretical findings to real world settings, we turned to the 
surprising persistence of varieties of capitalisms, mirrored by different and diverging levels of 
general trust and macro-performance, as the real-world proof of the pudding of our 
conjecture. Macro-performance is intimately connected to general trust in different shapes and 
both need to be explained by investigating the ‘deep’ interaction structure of socio-economies, 
particularly the co-evolution of expectations and the inner size structure of their overlapping 
arenas and platforms, localities, settlement structure, associations, clubs, unions, formal 
organizations, informal participation opportunities, decentralized state agencies, migration 
conditions, etc. 
The approach presented here could be further extended by defining a structured 
neighborhood for the agents. More elaborated models would need to be approached by 
computer simulation (for an attempt at this, see, e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 2011). Also, an 
important aspect we have not included so far, but that lab experiments have shown to be 
important in real-world settings, is n-person games, in which agents punish defection even 
when they were not harmed as a direct result of this defection (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1994; 
Binmore 2006). The move to n-player games can be expected to underline the problems 
identified in our set-up, and the solution mechanisms that can be derived, though, and offer a 
further strengthening of the need for institutional frameworks within which problem-solving 
behavior patterns are encouraged and supported. Still, n-player set-ups would conceivably 
allow the identification of additional factors supporting the emergence of cooperative 
behavior in populations. 
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Finally, the naturalistic inter-group selection perspective (as represented, e.g., by 
Henrich 2004) could be integrated into the EIGT perspective through analogous GT modeling 
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